Chapter 3: Introduction to Noncooperative Game Theory: Games in Normal Form

• Page number: 64
  • Section number: 3.3.4
  • Date: 16.7.2016
  • Name: Petr Poliak
  • Email: petrpoliak9@gmailDELETEthisTEXT.com
  • Content: End of first paragraph :"Here there is some good news—it was not just luck." It looks like it coulden't be decided whether "here" or "there" so better use both so noone misses the good news!
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The following errors are fixed in the second printing of the book and online PDF v1.1

• Page number: 52
  • Section number: Theorem 3.1.8 (Proof)
  • Date: 5 Feb 2009
  • Name: Nimalan Mahendran
  • Email: nimalan@csDELETEthisTEXT.ubc.ca
  • Content: The portion of the proof for the trivial case where the agent is indifferent should set u(.) = 0 for all outcomes and lotteries over outcomes. Part 2 is then immediate - decomposability is never used.
• Page number: 52
  • Section number: Theorem 3.1.8 (Proof)
  • Date: 5 Feb 2009
  • Name: Nimalan Mahendran
  • Email:nimalan@cs.ubc.ca
  • Content:o1 indiff l1 strict_pref l2 indiff o2 need only follow from transitivity and completeness.
• Page number: 71
  
  • Section number: Theorem 3.3.22 (Nash, 1951)
  • Date: 5 Feb 2009
  • Name: Nimalan Mahendran
  • Email:nimalan@cs.ubc.ca
  • Content:Notation: u_i(a_i, s_{-i}) represents i's utility of playing action a_i given everyone else played s_{-i}. The last paragraph of the proof contains the following notation, which is inconsistent: u_{i, a'_i}(s). This should be u_i(a'_i, s_{-i}).
• Page number: 52
  • Section number:Theorem 3.1.8 (Proof), Part 1
  • Date:6 Feb 2009
  • Name:Nimalan Mahendran
  • Email:nimalan@cs.ubc.ca
  • Content:In the first line of part 1, lottery l_1 should be [u(o_1) : o_overbar; 1 - u(o_1) : o_underbar] and similarly for l_2. Otherwise, (u(o_1) + (1 - u(o_2) = 1) does not necessarily hold, making it an invalid lottery. Also, the definition seems to follow (for me, at least) from the previous paragraph where it says o_i \indiff [u(o_i) : o_overbar; (1 - u(o_i)) : o_underbar].
• Page number: 52
  • Section number: Theorem 3.1.8
  • Date: June 19 2009
  • Name: Nicolas Dudebout
  • Email:
  • Content: The utility function should be defined not only over the finite set O but also over all the lotteries on O. Else, the LHS of Part 2 is not defined.
• Page number: 83
  • Section number: 3.4.6
  • Date: Feb 27, 2010
  • Name: Kevin
  • Content: Changed the definition of trembling-hand perfect equilibrium to use notation consistent with the rest of the book: "A mixed-strategy profile $s$ is a (trembling-hand) perfect equilibrium of a normal-form game $G$ if there exists a sequence $s^0, s^1, \ldots$ of fully mixed-strategy profiles such that $\lim_{n\rightarrow\infty}s^n=s$, and such that for each $s^k$ in the sequence and each player $i$, the strategy $s_i$ is a best response to the strategies $s_{-i}^k$."

-- KevinLeytonBrown - 13 Nov 2008