Multiagent Systems
Algorithmic, Game-Theoretic, and Logical Foundations


Yoav Shoham
Stanford University

Kevin Leyton-Brown
University of British Columbia


Cambridge University Press, 2009


Multiagent systems consist of multiple autonomous entities having different information and/or diverging interests. This comprehensive introduction to the field offers a computer science perspective, but also draws on ideas from game theory, economics, operations research, logic, philosophy and linguistics. It will serve as a reference for researchers in each of these fields, and be used as a text for advanced undergraduate and graduate courses.

Emphasizing foundations, the authors offer a broad and rigorous treatment of their subject, with thorough presentations of distributed problem solving, non-cooperative game theory, multiagent communication and learning, social choice, mechanism design, auctions, coalitional game theory, and logical theories of knowledge, belief, and other aspects of rational agency. For each topic, basic concepts are introduced, examples are given, proofs of key results are offered, and algorithmic considerations are examined. An appendix covers background material in probability theory, classical logic, Markov decision processes, and mathematical programming.